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1 
Reputation Life Cycle:  The Case of 
Franchising 
Uri Benoliel  
Law-and-economics conventional analysis contends that franchise 
termination laws, prohibiting opportunistic termination by the 
franchisor, are superfluous.  Well-rooted in traditional law-and-
economics opposition to such legislation is the belief that the reputation 
mechanism serves as a sufficient control against opportunistic 
termination by franchisors.  This article questions the idea that 
reputation concerns can be a substitute for regulation of franchise 
relationships. 
The article argues that the reputation mechanism suffers from an 
inherent deficiency, which disqualifies it from serving as a substitute for 
franchise termination legislation.  In short, the reputation mechanism 
often has a limited life cycle consisting of three stages: creation, erosion 
and collapse.  At the early stages of the franchisor organizational life 
cycle, the reputation mechanism may have some deterring effects on the 
franchisor.  At these stages, the incentive of the franchisor is normally to 
attract new franchisees and thus the franchisor attaches greater 
importance to being perceived as fair in the eyes of potential franchisees.  
As the franchisor’s financial resources increase, the effectiveness of the 
reputation mechanism will be eroded.  Particularly, the franchisor’s 
incentive to attract new franchisees will decrease.  Similarly, its 
incentive to maintain its present franchisees will decline.  Instead, the 
franchisor, having greater financial resources, will gradually shift 
towards self-ownership of the units.  Following the continuing decrease 
in the franchisor’s financial constraints and the decrease in its incentive 
to maintain and attract new franchisees, the reputation mechanism may 
collapse.  This may particularly occur when the reputation-related costs 
decrease to a minimum level, at which point they will be lower than the 
franchisor’s benefits from opportunistic termination of the franchise 
contract. 
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of Jerusalem, 2003.  This Article greatly benefited from comments and criticisms by Gary 
Castrogiovanni, Richard Epstein, Tamar Frankel, Warren Grimes, Steven Michael, 
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INTRODUCTION 
Legal economists have long debated whether the reputation 
mechanism can serve as a substitute for regulating the behavior 
of legal entities bound to a contractual relationship.1  If the 
importance of maintaining a good reputation in the market can 
effectively regulate or deter opportunistic behavior by the 
parties, legal regulation of the contractual relationship is a social 
waste.  Conversely, if the market-based reputation mechanism 
cannot deter opportunism, regulation of the relationship is more 
justifiable.  Traditional law-and-economics analysis, which has 
found its way into current legislative practices in the United 
States, tends to suggest that the reputation mechanism can 
indeed function as an effective substitute for costly regulation of 
contractual relationships.2  One commercial relationship in 
particular—the franchise relationship—is well-positioned, say 
legal economists, to be governed by reputation rather than by 
regulation. 
The franchise relationship involves two major legal entities: 
the franchisor provides its trademark or trade name and a 
business system, while the franchisee generally pays the 
franchisor an ongoing royalty and an initial fee.3  To date, the 
legal ties of franchise relationships are regulated by a minority of 
fifteen states in the United States.  These states enacted 
termination laws requiring ‘‘good cause’’ for the termination of a 
franchise contract by a franchisor,4 generally defined as the 
 
 1 See Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of 
Incomplete Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REV. 927, 978 n.232 (1990). 
 2 See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser, Reliance, Reputation, and Breach of Contract, 26 
J.L. & ECON. 691, 703 (1983) (presenting a model in which “reputation will substitute 
perfectly for a damage rule”);; DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. 
PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 57, 159–87 (1994) (suggesting that the reputation 
mechanism “can bring about long-term cooperation even if there is no enforceable 
contract”).  But see STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 323–
24 (2004) (arguing that the reputation mechanism is an imperfect substitute for courts). 
 3 The contract underlying the relationship between the two parties is the “franchise 
contract.”  International Franchise Association, Frequently Asked Questions About 
Franchising, http://www.franchise.org/industrysecondary.aspx?id=10008 (last visited Nov. 
1, 2009).  See generally Hadfield, supra note 1, at 931–32. 
 4 The fifteen ‘‘good cause’’ states are Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, Virginia, 
Washington, and Wisconsin.  See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-72-204 (2001); CAL. Bus. & PROF. 
CODE § 20020 (Deering 2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-133f (West 2007); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 6, § 2552(a) (2005); HAW. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 482E-6(2)(H) (LexisNexis 2009); 815 
IL.L. COMP. STAT. ANN. 705/19 (West 2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-2.7-1(1)(7) (West 
2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 523H.7(1) (West 2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 445.1527(27)(c) (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80C.14(3)(b) (West 2009); NEB. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 87-404 (LexisNexis 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-5 (West 2001); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 13.1-564 (2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.100.180(2)(j) (West 1999); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 135.03 (West 2009). 
Do Not Delete 2/2/2010 7:21 PM 
2009] Reputation Life Cycle 3 
franchisee’s failure to obey the franchise contract.5  Under these 
laws, a franchisor who concludes the franchise contract without a 
show of good cause must pay the franchisee damages.6  These 
franchise termination laws aim to protect franchisees against 
opportunistic treatment by franchisors, who inherently enjoy 
greater bargaining power.7  They are designed to protect 
franchisees from franchisors, who may terminate the franchise 
contract and opportunistically appropriate the profitable outlet 
developed by the franchisee.8  More specifically, an opportunistic 
franchisor may terminate the contract of an efficient franchisee, 
who fully complies with the franchise contract, in order to sell the 
latter’s profitable unit to a new franchisee for higher franchise 
fees.9  Alternatively, the franchisor can terminate the contract 
and manage the successful unit himself.10 
Conventional law-and-economics analysis proposes that 
franchise termination laws, prohibiting opportunistic termination 
by the franchisor, are superfluous.11  Deeply rooted in traditional 
law-and-economics opposition to such laws is the belief that the 
 
 5 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-72-202(7)(A) (2001); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 20020 
(Deering 2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-133f(a) (West 2007); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 482E-6(2)(H) (LexisNexis 2009); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 705/19(b) (West 2008); IND. 
CODE ANN. § 23-2-2.7-1(1)(7) (West 2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 523H.7(1) (West 2007); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.1527(27)(c) (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 80C.14(3)(3)(b) (West 2009); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 87-402(8) (LexisNexis 2007); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 56:10-5 (West 2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.100.180(2)(j) (West 1999). 
 6 Recoverable damages may include the following: (1) a fraction of the franchisee’s 
tangible assets used with respect to the terminated franchise, including sales outlets and 
facilities, offices, warehouses, trucks, furnishings, equipment, and accessories; (2) loss of 
goodwill; and (3) loss of profits.  See generally ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-72-208(b) (2001); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-133g(a) (West 2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2553(c) (2005); 815 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 705/26 (West 2008); IOWA CODE ANN. § 523H.13 (West 2007); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80C.17(1), (3) (West 2009); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 87-409 (LexisNexis 
2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-10 (West 2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-571(a) (2006); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 135.06 (West 2009). 
 7 VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-558 (2006); Geib v. Amoco Oil Co., 29 F.3d 1050, 1056 (6th 
Cir. 1994); Wright-Moore Corp. v. Ricoh Corp., 908 F.2d 128, 135 (7th Cir. 1990); Kubis & 
Perszyk Assocs. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 680 A.2d 618, 622 (N.J. 1996); Corp v. Atlantic 
Richfield Co., 860 P.2d 1015, 1018 (Wash. 1993); Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Contract 
Clauses and the Franchisor’s Duty of Care Toward Its Franchisees, 72 N.C. L. REV. 905, 
926 (1994); Robert W. Emerson, Franchising and the Collective Rights of Franchisees, 43 
VAND. L. REV. 1503, 1511 (1990). 
 8 Corp v. Atlantic Richfield, 860 P.2d at 1018; Robert W. Emerson, Franchise 
Terminations: Legal Rights and Practical Effects When Franchisees Claim the Franchisor 
Discriminates, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 559, 564–65 (1998); Robert W. Emerson, Franchise 
Selection and Retention: Discrimination Claims and Affirmative Action Programs, 40 
ARIZ. L. REV. 511, 519 (1998); Jean Wegman Burns, Vertical Restraints, Efficiency, and 
the Real World, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 597, 620–21 (1993). 
 9 ROGER D. BLAIR & FRANCINE LAFONTAINE, THE ECONOMICS OF FRANCHISING 271 
(2005). 
 10 Id. 
 11 See Michael J. Lockerby, Franchise Termination Restrictions: A Guide for 
Practitioners and Policy Makers, 30 ANTITRUST BULL. 791, 858–60, 866–71 (1985). 
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reputation mechanism can serve as a sufficient control against 
opportunistic termination by franchisors.  Since the incentive of 
franchisors is to maintain and attract franchisees, their 
motivation is to uphold a reputation of fairness.  Accordingly, out 
of concern for their reputation, franchisors are not likely to 
opportunistically terminate the franchise contract.12 
This “conventional law-and-economics opposition to franchise 
termination laws has been significantly influential in the 
development of franchise law in general, as witnessed by state 
and federal policy making.”13  Most states to date have refused to 
regulate general franchise termination laws prohibiting 
opportunistic termination of the franchise contract by the 
franchisor.14  At the federal level, such statutes have also been 
rejected.15  Yet legislators may be surprised to discover that the 
theoretical basis for this law-and-economics opposition to 
franchise termination laws is not quite as solid as one would 
hope. 
This article, therefore, calls into question the idea that 
reputation can be a substitute for franchise termination laws.  
The article argues that the reputation mechanism suffers from 
an inherent deficiency, which disqualifies it from serving as a 
substitute for franchise termination laws. 
In short, the argument is as follows: The reputation 
mechanism often has a limited life cycle consisting of three 
stages: creation, erosion and collapse.  At the earliest stage of the 
franchisor’s organizational life cycle, the reputation mechanism 
is created.  Normally, in this initial phase, the franchisor’s 
incentive is to maintain its previous franchisees and attract new 
ones.  The franchisor wishes to expand the market of its products 
as rapidly as possible, but is financially limited and cannot 
expand on its own.  Given the initial need of the franchisor to 
attract and maintain franchisees, the franchisor will be 
compelled to act in a manner which appears fair to present and 
prospective franchisees.  Opportunistic termination of the 
franchise contract is therefore less likely to occur, as legal 
 
 12 See infra Part II.A. 
 13 Uri Benoliel, The Expectation of Continuity Effect and Franchise Termination 
Laws: A Behavioral Perspective, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 139, 141 (2009). 
 14 Since 1992, about thirty states have refused to regulate general franchise 
termination laws.  See James A. Brickley, Royalty Rates and Upfront Fees in Share 
Contracts: Evidence from Franchising, 18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 511, 518 (2002). 
 15 For example, in 1998 and 1999 the federal government failed to pass two bills that 
would have made it unlawful for a franchisor to terminate a franchise contract without 
good cause.  See H.R. 4841, 105th Cong. (2nd Sess. 1998); H.R. 3308, 106th Cong. (1st 
Sess. 1999). 
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economists suggest, at the early stages of the franchisor’s 
organizational life cycle. 
However, following the creation of the reputation 
mechanism, its effectiveness is likely to be eroded.  Particularly, 
as the franchisor’s financial condition improves, the effectiveness 
of the reputation mechanism will steadily deteriorate.  As the 
franchisor’s financial resources increase, the franchisor will 
gradually shift away from attracting and maintaining 
franchisees towards operating, on its own, the present and 
prospective outlets in its chain.  This shift mainly derives from 
the fact that the franchisor normally gains more profits from a 
franchisor-owned unit than from a franchisee-owned unit.  As a 
result of this shift, the franchisor will be less concerned about 
being perceived as fair by present and prospective franchisees, 
which leads to the conclusion that termination without good 
cause is more likely to occur at this stage. 
Ultimately, the reputation mechanism may collapse.  
Following the gradual increase in the franchisor’s financial 
resources and the decrease in its incentive to maintain and 
attract new franchisees, the reputation mechanism will 
malfunction.  The reputation-related costs will reach a minimum 
level, which will be lower than the franchisor’s benefits from the 
opportunistic termination of the franchise contract.  When the 
franchisor accumulates enough financial resources to operate the 
whole franchise chain on its own, this outcome is to be expected.  
At this final stage—and herein lies the crux of the argument—
the franchisor’s reputation costs incurred from being perceived as 
unfair by present and prospective franchisees are likely to be 
lower than the benefits from opportunistic termination.  
Opportunistic termination therefore is likely to occur. 
Part I of this article will provide theoretical context by 
briefly reviewing the debate over the effectiveness of reputation 
as a substitute for franchise termination laws.  First, the 
arguments in favor of the reputation mechanism, which underlie 
the traditional law-and-economics disregard for franchise 
termination laws, will be introduced.  Second, I shall review the 
scant manifestations of skepticism as to the effectiveness of 
reputation in preventing opportunistic termination by 
franchisors.  Part II will demonstrate the intrinsic deficiency of 
the reputation mechanism in preventing opportunism by the 
franchisor, namely the reputation life-cycle.  The three major 
stages of the reputation life cycle will be presented—creation, 
erosion and collapse—with an eye toward uncovering the Achilles 
heel of the reputation mechanism.  While this article focuses 
predominantly on the (in)effectiveness of reputation in 
Do Not Delete 2/2/2010 7:21 PM 
6 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 13:1 
preventing opportunism in franchise relationships, I will 
conclude by suggesting broader implications of my analysis for 
the legal administration of other long-term commercial 
relationships. 
I.  THE DEBATE OVER REPUTATION 
A. Law-and-Economics Conventional Analysis 
Legal economists oppose franchise laws that require 
franchisors to demonstrate good cause for termination of a 
franchise contract.16  Essential to legal economists’ resistance to 
franchise termination laws is the argument that the market-
based reputation mechanism can function as a substitute for 
regulation.17  More specifically, legal economists argue that the 
reputation mechanism can prevent contract termination without 
good cause, since such termination will impose reputation-related 
costs on the franchisor.18  As Charles Goetz and Robert Scott 
argue, franchisors will “incur substantial ‘goodwill’ losses if they 
attempt to exploit a discretionary termination authority.”19 
Legal economists furthermore specify the reputation-related 
costs which will prevent termination without good cause.20  First, 
a franchisor who terminates the contract without good cause will 
encounter difficulties in retaining its other franchisees.  The 
franchisor, as Richard Epstein explains, “has incentives to act in 
 
 16 See generally James A. Brickley et al., The Economic Effects of Franchise 
Termination Laws, 34 J.L. & ECON. 101, 103–09, 130 (1991); Benjamin Klein, The 
Economics of Franchise Contracts, 2 J. CORP. FIN. 9, 30 (1995); Lockerby, supra note 11, 
at 858–71. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & 
ECON. 293, 314–15 (1975). 
 17 Another important argument that underlies legal economists’ resistance to 
franchise termination laws is that a statutory “good cause” requirement will increase 
franchisor termination costs and therefore tempt the franchisee to cheat or at least to free 
ride.  See Brickley et al., supra note 16, at 104; Epstein, supra note 16, at 314; Matthew 
Ellman, Specificity Revisited: The Role of Cross-Investments, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 234, 
250 n.36 (2006); Richard L. Smith II, Franchise Regulation: An Economic Analysis of 
State Restrictions on Automobile Distribution, 25 J.L. & ECON. 125, 136 (1982).  For a 
critical analysis of this argument, see generally Benoliel, supra note 13 (arguing that a 
statutory good cause requirement will enhance joint action, expression of trust, and fair 
treatment of both contractual parties). 
 18 Lockerby, supra note 11, at 860. 
 19 Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. 
REV. 1089, 1148 (1981).  See also James A. Brickely, Sanjog Misra & R. Lawrence Van 
Horn, Contract Duration: Evidence from Franchising, 49 J. L. & ECON. 173, 178 (2006); 
William L. Killion, One Person’s Sense of Justice Is Another’s Sense of Injustice, 24 
FRANCHISE L.J. 3, 6 (2004); Alan J. Meese, Antitrust Balancing in a (Near) Coasean 
World:  The Case of Franchise Tying Contracts, 95 MICH. L. REV. 111, 131 n.96 (1996); 
Daniel Clough, Law and Economics of Vertical Restraints in Australia, 25 MELB U. L. 
REV. 551, 580 (2001). 
 20 Epstein, supra note 16, at 314–15; Benjamin Klein & Lester F. Saft, The Law and 
Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts, 28 J. L. & ECON. 345, 356 (1985). 
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a manner which . . . appears to be fair if he wishes to retain his 
other franchisees.”21  Second, the franchisor will find it difficult 
to sell additional franchise units to new franchisees.  As 
Benjamin Klein & Lester Saft explain, “[t]he franchisor is not 
likely to terminate franchisees merely to confiscate their sunk 
investments opportunistically because franchisors must be 
concerned about their reputations when attempting to sell 
additional franchise locations.”22 
Law-and-economics scholars, therefore, uniformly base their 
analysis upon the implicit assumption that franchisors have a 
static incentive: to retain their franchisees and to attract new 
ones.  This assumption, however, is dubious, as will be 
demonstrated in this article. 
B. Skepticism about Reputation Effectiveness  
A handful of legal scholars manifest skepticism about the 
effectiveness of the reputation mechanism in controlling 
opportunistic termination by franchisors.  David Charny posed 
one of the earlier challenges to the effectiveness of the reputation 
mechanism, in his innovative article of the early 1990s.23  Charny 
argues that the reputation mechanism will not function if the 
 
 21 Epstein, supra note 16, at 315.  See also Thomas M. Pitegoff, Franchise 
Relationship Laws: A Minefield for Franchisors, 45 BUS. LAW. 289, 310 (1989); Smith, 
supra note 17, at 130; Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of 
Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521, 577 (1981); Boyd Allan Byers, Making a Case for Federal 
Regulation of Franchise Terminations—A Return-of-Equity Approach, 19 J. CORP. L. 607, 
651 (1994); Clough, supra note 19, at 580. 
 22 Benjamin Klein & Lester F. Saft, The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying 
Contracts, 28 J.L. & ECON. 345, 356 (1985); Roger D. Blair & Francine Lafontaine, 
Understanding the Economics of Franchising and the Laws That Regulate It, 26 
FRANCHISE L.J. 55, 64 (2006) (“There may be lurking concern that franchisors may abuse 
their ability to terminate franchise contracts in some opportunistic fashion.  Although 
there is some possibility of such opportunism, there is scant empirical support for it.  
From an economic perspective, this is not surprising because most franchisors want to 
expand, and it is hard to attract new franchisees while abusing incumbent franchisees.”);; 
See also Epstein, supra note 16, at 315; Lockerby, supra note 11, at 859–60; Pitegoff, 
supra note 21, at 310; Smith, supra note 17, at 130; Robert W. Emerson, Franchise 
Terminations, supra note 8, at 586; Alan J. Meese, Regulation of Franchisor Opportunism 
and Production of the Institutional Framework:  Federal Monopoly or Competition 
Between the States?, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 68 (1999); Jonathan Klick et al., 
Incomplete Contracts and Opportunism in Franchising Arrangements:  The Role of 
Termination Clauses 16–17 (Am. L. & Econ. Ass’n Ann. Meetings, Working Paper No. 61, 
2006), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/olin/papers/klick_paper.pdf; Jonathan 
Klick et al., The Effect of Contract Regulation: The Case of Franchising 33 (Geo. Mason L. 
& Econ. Res. Paper No. 07-03, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=951464; Henry 
N. Butler & Barry D. Baysinger, Vertical Restraints of Trade As Contractual Integration: 
A Synthesis of Relational Contracting Theory, Transaction-Cost Economics, and 
Organization Theory, 32 EMORY L.J. 1009, 1092 (1983); Byers, supra note 21, at 651; 
Clough, supra note 19, at 580; Muris, supra note 21, at 577; Killion, supra note 19, at 6. 
 23 David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. 
REV. 373 (1990). 
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franchisor ceases to use franchisees altogether.24  He suggests 
that this may occur once the franchisor “has established a 
market niche” or when the acquirer in a takeover puts in place a 
new management team that decides to terminate existing 
franchises.25 
Skepticism about the potential for reputation to control 
opportunistic termination by franchisors was also manifested in 
a seminal article on franchise contracts by Gilliland Hadfield.26  
First, Hadfield, similar to Charny, argues that the reputation 
mechanism will not function if the franchisor stops selling 
franchisees.27  She furthermore suggests that this may happen if 
the franchisor reaches a limit on the number of the franchise 
units it is able to sell.28  This limitation may often exist, she 
maintains, as franchisors provide their franchisees with 
territorial exclusivity.29  Hadfield’s second argument highlights 
the problematic fact that the reputation mechanism depends 
upon inferences, drawn by potential franchisees, about the 
franchisor’s past behavior.30  She claims, “the interdependence, 
the uncertainty, and the length of the relationship, as well as the 
inexperience of the franchisee all make the identification of 
franchisor opportunism very difficult.”31 
Over the next few years, other scholars joined in the dispute 
over the effectiveness of the reputation mechanism in the context 
of franchising.  Warren Grimes, for instance,32 argues that a 
franchisor is likely to be less constrained by reputation concerns 
in several circumstances.  First, a franchisor is likely to be less 
constrained by reputation concerns if a myth of high profitability 
surrounds franchising or certain types of franchising.33  Second, 
the reputation mechanism will be less effective if the franchisor 
can counter reputation damage by lowering the franchise fee.34  
Third, the reputation mechanism is less likely to operate as 
expected if the franchisor can make less-informed franchisees the 
target of opportunism.35  Fourth, the reputation mechanism’s 
effectiveness is dubious if the franchisor has a short-term 
 
 24 Id. at 434. 
 25 Id. at 435. 
 26 Hadfield, supra note 1. 
 27 Id. at 978 n.232. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Warren S. Grimes, When Do Franchisors Have Market Power? Antitrust Remedies 
for Franchisor Opportunism, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 105 (1996). 
 33 Id. at 130–31. 
 34 Id. at 131–33. 
 35 Id. at 133–34. 
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perspective.36  Finally, the reputation mechanism will be less 
effective if the franchisor misapprehends the extent of reputation 
damage.37 
While I agree with many of the scholarly objections leveled 
at the reputation mechanism in the past, the next part of this 
article contends that the reputation mechanism also suffers from 
an inherent deficiency: its limited life cycle.  The three major 
stages of the reputation life cycle will be presented in 
chronological order: creation, erosion and collapse.  A detailed 
analysis of the life cycle will reveal that the reputation 
mechanism is often, by its very nature, doomed to failure. 
II.  REPUTATION LIFE CYCLE 
A. Stage One:  Creation 
At the early stages of the franchisor organizational life cycle, 
the reputation mechanism may have some deterring effects on 
the franchisor; the franchisor may be particularly discouraged 
from terminating a franchise contract without good cause.  At 
these early stages, the incentive of the franchisor is normally to 
attract new franchisees (or other types of intermediaries, such as 
dealers and distributors) and thus the franchisor attaches 
greater importance on being perceived as fair in the eyes of 
potential franchisees.38  The initial incentive to attract new 
franchisees derives from three cumulative factors, which will be 
explained in greater detail below.  First, franchisors ordinarily 
wish to rapidly expand the market for their products by opening 
many pioneering outlets in various locations.39  Second, a young 
franchisor normally lacks the significant financial resources 
necessary to promptly expand the market on its own.40  Third, 
new franchisees, attracted by the young franchisor, can 
effectively support the franchisor in overcoming its initial 
financial constraints.41 
 
 36 Id. at 134–35. 
 37 Id. at 135. 
 38 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 39 Alfred R. Oxenfeldt & Anthony O. Kelly, Will Successful Franchise Systems 
Ultimately Become Wholly-Owned Chains?, 44 J. RETAILING 69, 74 (1968–69).  For a 
detailed discussion on this first factor see infra notes 42–59. 
 40 Rajiv P. Dant et al., Ownership Redirection in Franchised Channels, 11 J. PUB. 
POL’Y. & MKTG. 33, 34 (1992).  For a detailed discussion on this second factor see infra 
notes 60–72. 
 41 Scott A. Shane, Hybrid Organizational Arrangements and Their Implications for 
Firm Growth and Survival: A Study of New Franchisors, 39 ACAD. MGMT. J. 216, 220 
(1996) (describing the types of costs saved by the franchisor).  For a detailed discussion on 
this third factor see infra notes 73–105. 
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Franchisors generally hope to quickly expand the market for 
their products by opening many pioneering outlets in various 
locations.42  Swift expansion generates several benefits for 
franchisors.  First, a franchisor, entering the market early can 
snag superior geographic locations before the market becomes 
saturated by competitors.43  A franchisor who quickly develops its 
franchise system, on valuable real estate, may preempt its 
competitors;44 followers will face difficulties in gaining possession 
of the same valuable real estate, already held by the fast 
franchisor.45  McDonald’s, for example, effectively preempted 
precious real estate from its competitors, through favorable 
leases.46  Through its early expansion in the relatively novel 
sector of fast food, McDonald’s benefited from a first-move 
advantage.47  In addition, a franchisor who quickly develops its 
franchise system, may be able to lease or acquire assets in the 
early stages of the market at prices below those that will prevail 
in later stages, after the market has evolved.48 
Rapid expansion not only gives franchisors an edge over 
competitors, but also allows the franchisor to shape the market.49  
A franchisor that promptly expands the market for its products 
may influence customer preferences.50  In the early stages of 
many markets, consumers may not have a strong and precise 
opinion about their preferred value of the new product 
ingredients.51  They may also not have a strong inclination about 
their preferred combination of the product features.52  For 
example, when Coca Cola first penetrated the market, not many 
customers had a predetermined preference for how carbonated or 
sweet a cola should be.53  A successful early franchisor is likely to 
have a seminal influence on the customers’ preferences regarding 
 
 42 Oxenfeldt & Kelly, supra note 39, at 74. 
 43 Victoria Bordonaba Juste et al., Franchise Firm Entry Time Influence on Long-
term Survival, 37 INT’L J. RETAIL & DISTRIB. MGMT. 106, 109 (2009). 
 44 Oxenfeldt & Kelly, supra note 39, at 74; Steven C. Michael, First Mover Advantage 
Through Franchising, 18 J. BUS. VENTURING 61, 65 (2003). See generally Marvin B. 
Lieberman & David B. Montgomery, First-Mover Advantages, 9 STRAT. MGMT. J. 41, 44 
(1988). 
 45 Michael, supra note 44, at 65.  See generally Birger Wernerfelt, A Resource-based 
View of the Firm, 5 STRAT. MGMT. J. 171, 173 (1984). 
 46 JOHN F. LOVE, MCDONALD’S: BEHIND THE ARCHES 164–65 (1986). 
 47 Michael, supra note 44, at 65. 
 48 Lieberman& Montgomery, supra note 44, at 44; Michael, supra note 44, at 65. 
 49 Gregory S. Carpenter & Kent Nakamoto, Consumer Preference Formation and 
Pioneering Advantage, 26 J. MARK. RES. 285, 286 (1989). 
 50 Michael, supra note 44, at 66. 
 51 Carpenter & Nakamoto, supra note 49, at 286; Lieberman & Montgomery, supra 
note 44, at 46. 
 52 Carpenter & Nakamoto, supra note 49, at 286. 
 53 Id. 
Do Not Delete 2/2/2010 7:21 PM 
2009] Reputation Life Cycle 11 
the value of the product features.54  A franchisor may also 
influence customer preferences as to the combination of the 
product features.55  Coca Cola, for example, may have critically 
impacted the development of customers’ preferences for colas.56  
The influence on customers’ preferences may ultimately shift 
customers to favor the pioneer franchisor over later 
competitors,57 leading to a market share benefit.  Rapid 
expansion, therefore, is quite beneficial for franchisors.  
Empirical studies confirm that swift expansion is advantageous.  
Examining 137 U.S. franchisors in the restaurant industry, 
Steven Michael found that a rapid expansion strategy of 
franchisors leads to superior outlet share and ultimately to 
higher profitability.58  Similarly, data covering 188 Spanish 
franchise chains for an eight-year period show that an early 
entry strategy of franchisors leads to lower failure risk.59 
Nonetheless, despite the advantages, maneuvering an early 
entrance into the franchise market is difficult.  A young 
franchisor, wishing to rapidly expand the market for its products 
on its own, normally lacks the significant financial resources 
needed to fulfill its desire.60  Opening new outlets is often too 
costly for a financially immature franchisor.61  Three significant 
costs must normally be incurred by the young franchisor: 
information costs, start-up costs, and management costs.62 
To begin with, financial resources are required to gather 
information regarding the local market in which the franchisor 
may potentially expand.63  When a young franchisor system 
expands beyond its original geographic location, it generally 
 
 54 Id.; Lieberman & Montgomery, supra note 44, at 46. 
 55 Carpenter & Nakamoto, supra note 49, at 286. 
 56 Id.; Lieberman & Montgomery, supra note 44, at 46. 
 57 For empirical support, see Carpenter & Nakamoto, supra note 49, at 286, 294; 
Frank H. Alpert & Michael A. Kamins, An Empirical Investigation of Consumer Memory, 
Attitude, and Perceptions toward Pioneer and Follower Brands, 59 J. MKTG. 34, 36–37, 41 
(1995). 
 58 Michael, supra note 44, at 66–67, 69–71, 74.  See also Regis Coeurderoy & 
Rodolphe Durand, Leveraging the Advantage of Early Entry: Proprietary Technologies 
Versus Cost Leadership, 57 J. BUS. RES. 583, 584, 587, 589 (2004). 
 59 Juste et al., supra note 43, at 109, 112, 115. 
 60 Rajiv P. Dant et al., Ownership Redirection in Franchised Channels, 11 J. PUB. 
POL’Y  & MKTG. 33, 34 (1992); Richard E. Caves & William F. Murphy II, Franchising:  
Firms, Markets, and Intangible Assets, 42 S. ECON. J. 572, 581 (1976); Francine 
Lafontaine & Patrick J. Kaufmann, The Evolution of Ownership Patterns in Franchise 
Systems, 70 J. RETAILING 97, 99 (1994). 
 61 Lafontaine & Kaufmann, supra note 60, at 99. 
 62 Rajiv P. Dant & Audhesh K. Paswan, The Effect of Financial Resource Availability 
and System Size on Ownership Redirection in Franchised Channels of Distribution, 10 
ASIA PAC. J. MKTG & LOGISTICS 85, 86 (1998). 
 63 Lafontaine & Kaufmann, supra note 60, at 99. 
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lacks information regarding other local markets.64  Therefore, the 
franchisor needs to invest capital in searching for and identifying 
suitable locations.65  It should ideally also evaluate the local 
market conditions of each potential location.66  More specifically, 
the franchisor will have to invest resources in learning about 
local marketing strategies, input suppliers, and customer 
preferences, at each potential location.67  These information-
gathering costs are likely to augment with increases in the 
unfamiliarity, diversity, and uncertainty of local markets.68 
The franchisor, wishing to expand on its own, will 
furthermore incur considerable start-up costs in establishing 
each outlet.  The total start-up costs of each outlet can range 
from $20,000, at a minimum, to over $1,000,000, depending on 
the franchise chosen.69  Costs may involve renting or building an 
outlet, stocking it with inventory and equipment, and advertising 
it.70  Finally, a franchisor, ready and willing to promptly expand 
on its own, will incur significant management costs.  These costs 
include the necessary capital needed to select skilled managers to 
operate each outlet (selection costs).71  They also include 
expenditures for monitoring the managers’ performance 
(monitoring costs).72 
Since expanding rapidly is usually too costly for a young 
franchisor, its initial incentive will be to attract new 
franchisees.73  New franchisees will normally be able to 
 
 64 Thomas Bürkle & Thorsten Posselt, Franchising as a Plural System: A Risk-Based 
Explanation, 84 J. RETAILING 39, 41 (2008). 
 65 James G. Combs et al., A Strategic Groups Approach to the Franchising–
Performance Relationship, 19 J. BUS. VENTURING 877, 880 (2004). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Alanson P. Minkler, Why Firms Franchise: A Search Cost Theory, 148 J. INST. 
THEORETICAL ECON. 240, 242 (1992). 
 68 Id. at 242–43. 
 69 International Franchise Association, Frequently Asked Questions About 
Franchising, http://www.franchise.org/industrysecondary.aspx?id=10008 (last visited Nov. 
12, 2009). 
 70 Justin G. Longenecker et al., SMALL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT: LAUNCHING AND 
GROWING ENTREPRENEURIAL VENTURES 99–101 (14th ed. 2007). 
 71 See Shane, supra note 41, at 219; Seth W. Norton, An Empirical Look at 
Franchising as an Organizational Form, 61 J. BUS. 197, 204 (1988); Combs et al., supra 
note 65, at 880. 
 72 See Shane, supra note 41, at 219–20; Seth W. Norton, Franchising, Brand Name 
Capital, and the Entrepreneurial Capacity Problem, 9 STRAT. MGMT. J. 105, 106 (1988); 
James A. Brickley & Fredrick H. Dark, The Choice of Organizational Form: The Case of 
Franchising, 18 J. FIN. ECON. 401, 403 (1987). 
 73 Rajiv P. Dant et al., supra note 60, at 34; Brent L. Baker & Rajiv P. Dant, Stable 
Plural Forms in Franchise Systems:  An Examination of the Evolution of Ownership 
Redirection Research, in STRATEGY AND GOVERNANCE OF NETWORKS: COOPERATIVES, 
FRANCHISING, AND STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 87, 92 (George Hendrikse et al. eds. 2008); 
Shelby D. Hunt, The Trend Toward Company-Operated Units in Franchise Chains, 49 J. 
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effectively assist the financially immature franchisor in 
overcoming its initial economic constraints.  To begin with, 
franchisees often incur the information costs needed to find 
suitable locations for expansion in locations which are unfamiliar 
to the franchisor.74  Notably, franchisees are likely to have 
valuable information regarding potential local markets, which 
the youthful franchisor lacks.75  This is mainly because they 
usually reside in the community in which the new unit is 
planned to be established.76 
In addition, franchisees will commonly incur the start-up 
costs involved in establishing new outlets, including equipment, 
inventory building, and real estate costs.77  Franchisees 
furthermore reduce the management costs needed to operate an 
outlet.78  First, they reduce the selection costs needed to recruit 
qualified managers.79  Franchisees typically agree to invest 
heavily in the outlet and to receive a residual claim on the 
outlet’s uncertain profits.80  By doing so, franchisees signal their 
management capabilities, compared to salaried managers, who 
are willing to take the job.81  Second, franchisees reduce the 
monitoring costs needed to scrutinize the performance of 
managers.82  Since franchisees invest significant resources in the 
outlet and have a residual claim on the outlet’s profit, they are 
less likely than salaried managers, to put forth a suboptimal 
effort level.83 
Franchisees support the franchisor in overcoming its initial 
financial constraints, not only by incurring and reducing 
significant costs, but also by directly providing the franchisor 
significant capital.84  First, if the franchise involves the sale of 
products by the franchisor to the franchisee, the sale price will 
usually comprise a mark-up over cost representing the 
 
RETAILING 3, 4 (1973); Oxenfeldt & Kelly, supra note 39, at 71; Caves & Murphy, supra 
note 60, at 581. 
 74 Combs et al., supra note 65, at 880.  Sometimes, franchisors select the location, 
but then they collect fees from franchisees for this service.  Hadfield, supra note 1, at 936. 
 75 Bürkle & Posselt, supra note 64, at 41; Minkler, supra note 67, at 243; Anna 
Watson et al., Retail Franchising: An Intellectual Capital Perspective, 12 J. RETAILING 
CONSUMER SERVICES 25, 28 (2005). 
 76 Bürkle & Posselt, supra note 64, at 41; Combs et al., supra note 65, at 880; 
Lafontaine & Kaufmann, supra note 60, at 99. 
 77 Lafontaine & Kaufmann, supra note 60, at 99. 
 78 Combs et al., supra note 65, at 880. 
 79 Shane, supra note 41, at 220. 
 80 Id. at 220; Norton, supra note 71, at 205; Combs et al., supra note 65, at 880. 
 81 Shane, supra note 41, at 220. 
 82 Id. at 219–21. 
 83 Brickley & Dark, supra note 72, at 404–05; Shane, supra note 41, at 221; Combs et 
al., supra note 65, at 880; Watson et al., supra note 75, at 28. 
 84 Hadfield, supra note 1, at 935. 
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franchisor’s return.85  In addition, each franchisee ordinarily pays 
the franchisor an initial lump-sum fee, called a franchise fee86—
generally ranging between $10,000 and $30,000.87  Moreover, 
each franchisee provides a constant and on-going stream of 
capital to the franchisor, via royalty rates.88  Normally, royalty 
rates are calculated as a percentage of sales revenues.89  The 
average royalty rate paid in 2001 was 5.2%, which in real terms 
translates to about $500 per month.90  Many franchisees also pay 
the franchisor advertising fees,91 to support franchisors in 
advertising their product or service regionally or nationally.92  
These fees are most often a steady percentage, usually one to two 
percent,93 of the franchisee’s monthly sales revenue.94  Finally, 
franchisees occasionally pay fees to franchisors for bookkeeping 
and management consultation services.95 
Given the significant capital that franchisees provide to the 
youthful franchisor, and their ability to support him in 
overcoming its financial constraints,96 one would posit that the 
initial incentive of the franchisor will be to attract franchisees.  
This theoretical contention is, in fact, empirically supported.  
Francine Lafontaine conducted a survey of, among other things, 
franchisors’ motivation for using franchisees.97  The survey was 
 
 85 Id. 
 86 James G. Combs & David J. Ketchen, Jr., Can Capital Scarcity Help Agency 
Theory Explain Franchising? Revisiting the Capital Scarcity Hypothesis, 42 ACAD. MGMT. 
J. 196, 199 (1999); Lafontaine & Kaufmann, supra note 60, at 99; Hadfield, supra note 1, 
at 935. 
 87 International Franchise Association, Frequently Asked Questions About 
Franchising, http://www.franchise.org/industrysecondary.aspx?id=10008 (last visited Nov. 
12, 2009).  For statistics on the variation in franchise fees, see generally BLAIR & 
LAFONTAINE, supra note 9, at 56–61. 
 88 Hadfield, supra note 1, at 935; Watson, supra note 75, at 25. 
 89 BLAIR & LAFONTAINE, supra note 9, at 62. 
 90 Id. at 67, 69. 
 91 Id. at 69. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Longenecker et al., supra note 70, at 100. 
 94 BLAIR & LAFONTAINE, supra note 9, at 69. 
 95 Hadfield, supra note 1, at 936.  Notably, franchisors sometimes also obtain a 
commission from approved suppliers of their new franchisees.  Id. 
 96 But see P. H. Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise 
Contract, 21 J. L. & ECON. 223, 225–26 (1978) (suggesting that passive investors, such as 
stockholders, are a superior source of capital than franchisees).  However, for 
explanations of why franchisees are in fact a superior source of capital than passive 
investors, see, for example, Robert E. Martin & Robert T. Justis, Franchising, Liquidity 
Constraints and Entry, 25 APPLIED ECON. 1269, 1271–72 (1993); Lafontaine & Kaufmann, 
supra note 60, at 99; Francine Lafontaine, Agency Theory and Franchising: Some 
Empirical Results, 23 RAND J. ECON. 263, 267 (1992). 
 97 Francine Lafontaine, How and Why do Franchisors Do What They Do: A Survey 
Report, in FRANCHISING: PASSPORT FOR GROWTH & WORLD OF OPPORTUNITY, 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH CONFERENCE OF THE SOCIETY OF FRANCHISING (Patrick 
Kaufmann ed. 1992). 
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based on the answers given by 130 franchisors, all members of 
the International Franchise Association, and involved in a 
variety of businesses.98  The majority of the respondents began 
franchising only recently.99  Franchisors participating in the 
survey explained that they became involved in franchising 
mainly because it allowed them to expand rapidly, especially 
because franchisees provide capital to franchisors.100  In another 
survey, conducted by Rajiv Dant, of 79 founders and 
representatives of franchisors, similar results were found.101  
Respondents were primarily drawn from the following 
franchising sectors: fast food and restaurants, gifts and home 
decorations, hospitality, convenience stores, and services.102  The 
majority of respondents classified their business in the 
introduction or growth stages of its life cycle,103 indicating the 
relative youthfulness of the franchisors.104  According to the 
survey, the most cited motivations for attracting franchisees 
were “market entry and growth” and “capital access and 
profits.”105 
B. Stage Two:  Erosion 
As the franchisor’s financial resources increase, the 
effectiveness of the reputation mechanism will erode.  
Particularly, the franchisor’s incentive to attract new franchisees 
will decrease.106  Similarly, its incentive to maintain its present 
franchisees will decline.107  Instead, the franchisor, having 
greater financial resources, will gradually shift towards owning 
 
 98 Id. at 2, 4. 
 99 Id. at 3. 
 100 Id. at 11. 
 101 Rajiv P. Dant, Motivation for Franchising: Rhetoric Versus Reality, 14 INT’L SMALL 
BUS. J. 10 (1995). 
 102 Id. at 15. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 16. 
 105 Id. at 23.  For further empirical support to the hypothesis that the initial incentive 
of franchisors is to attract new franchisees due to financial constraints, see Lorelle 
Frazer, Why Franchisors Discontinue Franchising but Continue Operating, 19 INT’L 
SMALL BUS. J. 29, 32 (2001); David A. Kirby & Anna Watson, Overcoming the Financial 
Constraints on Small Firm Growth: The Case of Franchising, 6 J. OF PRIVATE EQUITY 61, 
63 (2003); Anne Marie Doherty, The Internationalization of Retailing:  Factors Influencing 
the Choice of Franchising as a Market Entry Strategy, 18 INT’L J. SERV. INDUS. MGMT. 
184, 194 (2007); Scott Weaven & Carmel Herington, Factors Influencing Governance 
Choice and Human Resource Management Within Services Franchising Networks, J. 
MGMT. & ORG. 126, 132 (2007).  For indirect empirical support, see Lafontaine & 
Kaufmann, supra note 60, at 110 (“the fact that franchisors [examined in the study] that 
were subsidiaries of larger corporations owned more of their own units, point toward the 
idea that access to resources might constrain some firms to operate less units than they 
would like.”). 
 106 Oxenfeldt & Kelly, supra note 39, at 75. 
 107 Id. 
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the units himself.108  The franchisor will specifically want to 
progressively open new outlets under franchisor-ownership, 
which would have been opened as a franchisee-owned outlet, 
when the franchisor lacked financial resources.  In addition, the 
franchisor’s motivation will be to gradually transform the 
existing franchisee-owned outlets in his chain into franchisor-
owned outlets. 
The shift in the franchisor’s incentive stems from the fact 
that the profits that a franchisor can make, by owning a unit, are 
normally greater than the profits it can amass through a 
franchisee-owned unit.109  True, establishing and maintaining a 
franchisor-owned unit is costly for the franchisor since it involves 
information, start-up, and management costs.  In addition, a 
franchisee-owned unit provides the franchisor capital through a 
lump-sum fee, franchise fees, and other fees.110  However, in the 
long-run, a franchisor-owned unit is more profitable for the 
franchisor than a franchisee-owned unit.111  With its company-
owned and operated units, the franchisor continually keeps all of 
the profits of the unit, whereas with franchised units its chief 
source of profit is a lump-sum fee and ongoing fees computed as a 
small percentage of the gross revenue.112 
The superiority of franchisor-owned units over franchisee-
owned units in generating franchisor’s profits is empirically 
supported.  For example, Thomas Ehrmann and Georg Spranger 
examine the financials of seven large public U.S. restaurant 
retail chains through their annual 10-k filings with the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission.113  They examine each 
franchisor’s gross margin ratios as well as the operating income 
ratios for franchisor-owned to franchisee-owned units.114  For 
each franchisor analyzed in the study, the single franchisor-
 
 108 Id.; Rajiv P. Dant et al., What We Know About Ownership Redirection in 
Franchising: A Meta-Analysis, 72 J. Retailing 429, 434 (1996); Caves & Murphy, supra 
note 60, at 581; Gary J. Castrogiovanni et al., Shifting Imperatives:  An Integrative View 
of Resource Scarcity and Agency Reasons for Franchising, 30 ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY 
& PRAC. 23, 25 (2006); Baker & Dant, supra note 73, at 92. 
 109 Baker & Dant, supra note 73, at 92. 
 110 See supra Part II.A. 
 111 Hunt, supra note 73, at 6–7; Hadfield, supra note 1, at 936–37; Paul Tracey & 
Owen Jarvis, Toward a Theory of Social Venture Franchising, 31 ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
THEORY & PRAC. 667, 669 (2007); James G. Combs et al., Franchising: A Review and 
Avenues to Greater Theoretical Diversity, 30 J. MGMT. 907, 909–10 (2004). 
 112 Baker & Dant, supra note 73, at 92; James G. Combs & Gary J. Castrogiovanni, 
Franchisor Strategy:  A Proposed Model and Empirical Test of Franchise Versus Company 
Ownership, 32 J. SMALL BUS. MGMT. 37, 38–39 (1994). 
 113 Thomas Ehrmann and Georg Spranger, Franchisee Versus Company Ownership—
An Empirical Analysis of Franchisor Profit, in ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT OF 
NETWORKS 31, 39–40 (Gérard Cliquet et al., eds. 2007). 
 114 Id. at 40. 
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owned unit added far more to both the gross margin and to the 
total operating income than the single franchisee-owned unit.115  
Similarly, Urban Ozanne and Shelby Hunt found that sales in 
franchisor-owned outlets in the fast food industry are on average 
significantly higher than those in franchisee-owned outlets.116 
Anecdotal evidence bolsters the contention that franchisor-
owned units are superior to franchisee-owned units in generating 
franchisor profits, as expressed in several classic statements by 
franchisors.  For example, John Jay Hooker famously stated: 
As all of you know, the name of the game is not really franchising.  
The name of the game is company stores.  I was looking at some 
figures not too long ago and saw where a big company in America has 
1,600–1,700 units, and only two hundred of those were company-
owned, but the two hundred company-owned units were producing 
sixty percent of the net after taxes. . . the real name of the game is 
owning the stores yourself.117 
Similarly, Lawrence E. Singer, who was the president of Royal 
Castle System Inc. has noted: “We make more profit, per unit, 
than we could possibly make in franchising.  This fact has been 
acknowledged by many of the franchise operators.”118 
Given the superiority of franchisor-owned units over 
franchisee-owned units, the effectiveness of the reputation 
mechanism is likely to be eroded when the franchisor’s financial 
constraints decrease.  As the resources needed for establishing 
and operating units become more attainable by the franchisor, 
forgoing the higher levels of profit attained through franchisor 
ownership ceases to be necessary.119  Indeed, empirical studies 
indicate that as the franchisor’s financial resources increase, the 
reputation mechanism erodes.  These studies particularly 
 
 115 Id. at 41. 
 116 S. Select Comm. on Small Business, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., Report on the Economic 
Effects of Franchising 87 (Comm. Print 1971) (written by Urban B. Ozanne & Shelby D. 
Hunt); Hunt, supra note 73, at 7. 
 117 John Jay Hooker, The Story of Minnie Pearl—A Case History of One New 
Company’s Trials, Tribulations and Triumphs, in FRANCHISING TODAY: REPORT ON THE 
FIFTH INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE ON FRANCHISING 164, 171 (Charles L. 
Vaughn ed. 1970). 
 118 Lawrence E. Singer, To Franchise or Not—How to Decide: Con—Why Company-
Owned Units, in FRANCHISING TODAY: 1966–1967 23, 24 (Charles L. Vaughn & David B. 
Slater eds. 1967).  Likewise, William Ware of PKI Foods, Inc., stated: 
More profits can be gained from company-owned stores.  A break-even analysis 
of operations in the $225,000 to $300,000 range shows this fact to be very true.  
Since our stores average $270,000 per unit per year and some clear between 
$50,000 and $100,000, it becomes evident that our stores are more profitable 
than if franchised. 
William Ware, To Franchise or Not—How to Decide: Con—Why Company-Owned Units, in 
FRANCHISING TODAY: 1966–1967 27, 29 (Charles L. Vaughn & David B. Slater eds. 1967). 
 119 Baker & Dant, supra note 73, at 92. 
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confirm that as the financial availability of the franchisor 
increases, its incentive will gradually shift away from attracting 
new franchisees and maintaining the present ones, towards 
owning prospective and present outlets.120  For example, Rajiv 
Dant and Patrick Kaufmann examine the changes in ownership 
patterns of franchise systems as the franchisor financially 
matures.121  They utilize a national mail survey of the franchised 
fast food restaurant industry franchisors, and analyze a total of 
152 questionnaires filled out by franchisors.122  The questionnaire 
asks the franchisor respondent to provide details of ownership 
patterns, unit reacquisition activity, new units sale activity, and 
franchisor’s resource availability position.123  The questionnaires 
were most frequently completed by presidents, CEOs, or founders 
of the franchise.124  The typical franchisor commenced its 
operation in 1966, sold its first franchise in 1974, and had about 
200 outlets.125  Dant and Kaufmann’s study confirms the validity 
of the hypothesis that the greater the franchisor’s internal access 
to financial, informational, and managerial resources, the more 
likely the strategic tendency toward company ownership of 
outlets.126  The strategic tendency toward company ownership of 
outlets is measured by two factors.  First, the inclination of 
franchisors to substitute existing franchisee-owned outlets with 
franchisor-owned outlets (retrospective substitution), was 
considered.127  This inclination is captured mainly by comparing 
(a) the number of franchisee-owned units reported by the 
franchisor to have been permanently converted into franchisor-
owned units and (b) the number of franchisor-owned units 
 
 120 Notably, other contradicting empirical studies also examine the relationship 
between the size and age of the franchisor and its ownership patterns.  See, for example, 
Hunt, supra note 73, at 9; Scott Shane, Explaining the Distribution of Franchised and 
Company-Owned Outlets in Franchise Systems, 24 J. MGMT. 717, 724–25, 730, 735 (1998); 
Gary J. Castrogiovanni et al., Resource Scarcity and Agency Theory Predictions 
Concerning the Continued Use of Franchising in Multi-Outlet Networks, 44 J. SMALL BUS. 
MGMT. 27, 30, 36–37 (2006); Lorelle Frazer, Causes of Disruption to Franchise Operations, 
54 J. BUS. RES. 227, 229–30, 232 (2001); Lafontaine & Kaufmann, supra note 60, at 110; 
Ilan Alon, The Use of Franchising by U.S.-Based Retailers, 39 J. SMALL BUS. MGMT. 111, 
117 (2001); Combs & Castrogiovanni, supra note 112, at 45. 
 121 Rajiv P. Dant & Patrick J. Kaufmann, Structural and Strategic Dynamics in 
Franchising, 79 J. RETAILING 63 (2003). 
 122 Id. at 67. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. at 68. 
 125 Id.  
 126 Id. at 72.  For similar results and dataset, see Patrick J. Kaufmann & Rajiv P. 
Dant, Multi-Unit Franchising: Growth and Management Issues, 11 J. BUS. VENTURING 
343, 351, 354 (1996); Rajiv P. Dant & Patrick J. Kaufmann, Robert A. Robicheaux, 
Changes in the Mix of Company-Owned and Franchised Outlets: Ownership Redirection 
Revisited, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY OF FRANCHISING CONFERENCE 
4, 13 (1998). 
 127 Dant & Kaufmann, supra note 121, at 67. 
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reported by the franchisor to have been permanently converted 
into franchisee-owned units.128  The strategic tendency toward 
company ownership is furthermore measured by the propensity 
of franchisors to open new outlets under franchisor-ownership 
which would have been opened as a franchisee-owned outlet 
earlier in the franchisor’s history (prospective substitution).129  
This tendency is calculated by comparing (a) the current year’s 
pattern of new units opening activity to (b) the pattern of 
ownership as established by previous year’s composition of 
franchisor-owned units versus franchisee-owned units.130 
Empirical support for the erosion of the reputation 
mechanism in several key industries was also established in a 
study by Rajiv Dant and Audhesh Paswan.  Dant and Paswan 
culled data from successive volumes of Franchising in the 
Economy to test, among other things, the shifts in ownership 
patterns of franchise systems as the franchisor financially 
matures,131 spanning the period of 1977 through 1986.132  They 
find in the rentals (equipment) industry, as well as in the hotels, 
motels and campground industry, that as the financial resource 
availability of franchisor increases there will be greater incidence 
of ownership redirection favoring the franchisor.133  Ownership 
redirection, in this context, was captured by the inclination of 
franchisors to substitute existing franchisee-owned outlets with 
franchisor-owned outlets.  This inclination is measured mainly by 
comparing the number of franchisee-owned units converted to 
franchisor-owned units with the number of franchisor-owned 
units converted to franchisee-owned units.134 
Another empirical study, conducted by James Combs and 
David Ketchen, indicates that as the financial resources of the 
franchisor increase, the reputation mechanism erodes.135  Combs 
and Ketchen’s sample is drawn from the restaurant industry 
during the years 1989 through 1993.136  Their study relies mainly 
on franchisor’s annual reports and Compact Disclosure, a 
comprehensive database of public firms.137  Examining data from 
91 restaurant chains, Combs and Ketchen empirically confirm 
the hypothesis that the less a franchisor encounters difficulties 
 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. at 67–68. 
 130 Id. at 68. 
 131 Dant & Paswan, supra note 62, at 90. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. at 93, 96, 99. 
 134 Id. at 93. 
 135 Combs et al., supra note 86, at 199. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. at 199, 201. 
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stemming from a lack of capital, the less the franchisor will rely 
on expansion through franchising as opposed to franchisor 
ownership.138 
C. Stage Three:  Collapse 
Following the continuing decrease in the franchisor’s 
financial constraints and the decrease in its incentive to 
maintain and attract new franchisees, the reputation mechanism 
may collapse.  This may particularly occur when the reputation-
related costs decrease to a minimum level, at which they will be 
lower than the franchisor benefits from opportunistic termination 
of the franchise contract.  Such a low level is reached when the 
franchisor accrues sufficient capital to manage the whole 
franchise chain on its own.  At this stage, the franchisor’s 
reputation costs from being perceived as unjust by present and 
prospective franchisees are likely to be lower than the benefits 
from opportunistic termination.  Termination without good cause 
therefore is likely to occur. 
An analysis of case law on dealership and distributorship 
relationships, which are often governed by franchise termination 
laws, arguably reveals the collapse of the reputation mechanism 
that follows a gradual improvement in a franchisor’s financial 
position.  An early illustrative case is Kealey Pharmacy & Home 
Care Servs. Inc. v. Walgreen Co.139  Between 1972 and 1979, 
Walgreen sold a wide variety of drugs, beauty aids, and 
household commodities to consumers through a nation-wide 
system of both Walgreen-owned stores and dealers using the 
Walgreen brand-name.140  The dealers independently owned 
drugstores pursuant to a standard dealership agreement with 
Walgreen.141  Throughout the contractual relationship between 
Walgreen and its dealers, the dealers provided capital to 
Walgreen in two chief ways.  First, the dealers paid for 
merchandise which they purchased from Walgreen.142  In 
addition, the dealers provided capital to Walgreen indirectly by 
 
 138 Combs et al., supra note 86, at 199, 202.  For similar results and dataset, see Vera 
L. Hoover, David J. Ketchen, Jr. & James G. Combs, Why Restaurant Firms Franchise: 
An Analysis of Two Possible Explanations, 44 CORNELL HOTEL AND REST. ADMIN. Q. 9, 14 
(2003); see also James G. Combs & David J. Ketchen, Jr., Explaining Interfirm 
Cooperation and Performance: Toward a Reconciliation of Predictions from the Resource-
Based View and Organizational Economics, 20 STRAT. MGMT. J. 867, 872, 880 (1999). 
 139 Kealey Pharmacy & Home Care Servs., Inc. v. Walgreen Co., 761 F.2d 345, 347 
(7th Cir. 1985). 
 140 Kealey Pharmacy & Home Care Serv., Inc. v. Walgreen Co., 539 F. Supp. 1357, 
1360–1361 (W.D. Wis. 1982), aff’d, 761 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 141 Kealey Pharmacy & Home Care Servs., Inc., 761 F.2d, at 347. 
 142 Kealey Pharmacy & Home Care Serv., Inc. v. Walgreen Co., 607 F. Supp. 155, 158 
(W.D. Wis. 1984), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 761 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1985). 
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promoting the Walgreen name, image, and reputation in their 
local communities.143  Arguably, Walgreen relied on these dealers 
to provide the significant financial resouces needed to promote 
Walgreen products, which Walgreen lacked at that stage.  During 
the contractual relationships of Walgreen with its dealers, 
Walgreen’s net sales were almost constantly increasing.144  For 
example, Walgreen’s net sales in 1972 were $863,334,000;145 
whereas by 1979, Walgreen’s net sales had jumped to 
$1,344,542,000.146  Figure 1 outlines Walgreen’s increase in net 
sales between 1972 and 1979. 
Figure 1: Walgreen’s Net Sales: 1972–1979 (in thousands) 
In 1980, following the constant increase in Walgreen’s 
annual net sales, it arguably reached a stage in its organizational 
life cycle in which it had enough financial resources at its 
disposal to operate all the stores on its own.147  Indeed, in that 
year, Walgreen decided to adjust its marketing strategy.  In 
particular, Walgreen made a decision to cease its reliance on 
dealers.148  Instead, Walgreen chose to maintain and increase its 
own stores in the same geographic areas where the dealers had 
already helped build up Walgreen’s reputation and image.149  At 
this stage, the reputation mechanism collapsed.  Walgreen was 
no longer interested in relying on the financial resources 
 
 143 Kealey Pharmacy & Home Care Serv. Inc., 607 F. Supp. at 159.  For example, all of 
the prescription drugs that the dealers sold included the words “Walgreen Agency.”  Id. 
 144 These are the annual net sales of Walgreen during 1972 and 1979 (in thousands): 
$863,334 (1972), $930,898 (1973), $996,616 (1974), $1,079,143 (1975), $1,169,779 (1976), 
$1,223,249 (1977), $1,192,855 (1978), $1,344,542 (1979).  See WALGREEN CO., ANNUAL 
REPORTS (1972–1979). 
 145 WALGREEN CO., 1972 ANNUAL REPORT (1972). 
 146 WALGREEN CO., 1979 ANNUAL REPORT (1979). 
 147 See generally WALGREEN CO., ANNUAL REPORTS (1972–1979); Kealey Pharmacy & 
Home Care Servs., Inc. v. Walgreen Co., 761 F.2d 345, 347 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 148 Kealey Pharmacy & Home Care Servs. 761 F.2d at 350. 
 149 Id. 
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provided by the dealers, and thus had no reason to fear a blow to 
its reputation.150  Termination without good cause was likely to 
occur.  In fact, Walgreen terminated its dealership agreements 
absent any showing that the dealers failed to comply with the 
requirements imposed by Walgreen.151 
Another important case which reveals the collapse of the 
reputation mechanism following a gradual improvement in the 
franchisor’s resource availability is Atlantic City Coin & Slot 
Serv. Co. v. IGT.152  International Game Technology (IGT) 
designs and manufactures electronic gaming devices.153  During 
1983 and 1997 IGT expanded its products in New Jersey, 
Maryland, and the Caribbeans using an exclusive distributor.154  
Throughout the contractual relationship between the IGT and 
the distributor, the latter provided significant financial 
assistance to IGT.155  More specifically, the exclusive distributor 
invested significant financial resources in promoting the IGT 
name, expanding a sales force, expanding a marketing facility, 
expanding a storage area for IGT products, and leasing 
warehousing devoted to storing, testing, and servicing of IGT 
gaming devices.156  Arguably, IGT relied on its exclusive 
distributor since it could provide the significant resources 
necessary to promote IGT products—resources which IGT lacked 
at that early stage.  Throughout its contractual relationship with 
the exclusive distributor, IGT’s annual total revenues were 
almost constantly increasing.157  For example, in 1983 IGT total 
revenues were $60,032,000;158 whereas by 1997, IGT total 
revenues had jumped to $743,970,000.159  Figure 2 demonstrates 
graphically IGT’s increase in total revenues between 1983 and 
1997. 
 
 
 150 See generally Combs et al., supra note 86 (discussing the deterioration of the 
reputation mechanism that corresponds with an increase in financial resources). 
 151 Kealey Pharmacy & Home Care Servs., Inc. 761 F.2d at 350. 
 152 Atlantic City Coin & Slot Serv. Co. v. IGT, 14 F. Supp. 2d 644 (D.N.J. 1998). 
 153 Id. at 647. 
 154 Id. at 647, 649. 
 155 Id. at 654. 
 156 Id. at 646, 653–54. 
 157 These are the annual total revenues of IGT during 1983 and 1997 (in thousands): 
$60,032 (1983), $73,262 (1984), $56,564 (1985), $41,574 (1986), $83,522 (1987), $98,694 
(1988), $151,152 (1989), $210,257 (1990), $237,363 (1991), $399,443 (1992), $478,030 
(1993), $674,461 (1994), $620,786 (1995), $733,452 (1996), $743,970 (1997).  See 
INTERNATIONAL GAME TECHNOLOGY, ANNUAL REPORTS (1983–1993); INTERNATIONAL 
GAME TECHNOLOGY; FORMS 10-K (1994–1997). 
 158 INTERNATIONAL GAME TECHNOLOGY, ANNUAL REPORT (1983). 
 159 INTERNATIONAL GAME TECHNOLOGY, Form 10-K (1997). 
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Figure 2: IGT Annual Total Revenue: 1983-1997 (in thousands) 
In 1997, following the constant increase in IGT annual total 
revenues, it arguably reached a stage in its organizational life 
cycle in which it had access to enough financial resources to 
replace its exclusive distributor with an IGT-owned distribution 
system.  Predictably in that year, IGT decided to discontinue its 
relationship with its exclusive distributor.160  Instead, IGT chose 
to promote and sell its product on its own.161  At this stage the 
reputation mechanism collapsed because IGT was no longer 
interested in relying on distributors.162  Termination without 
good cause was likely to occur.  Indeed, IGT terminated its 
distribution agreement with its exclusive distributor in 1998, 
without any allegations of wrongdoing to justify the 
termination.163  Rather, IGT praised the exclusive distributor’s 
performance just prior to terminating the relationship.164  Good 
cause supporting the contract termination was noticeably 
absent.165 
The collapse of the reputation mechanism is likewise 
evidenced by the case of Day Distrib. Co. v. Nantucket Allserve, 
 
 160 Atlantic City Coin & Slot Serv. Co. v. IGT, 14 F. Supp. 2d 644, 658–59 (D.N.J. 
1998). 
 161 Id. at 659. 
 162 Id. at 646. 
 163 Id. at 658–59. 
 164 Id. at 658. 
 165 Id. 
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Inc..166  Nantucket Allserve, Inc. (Nantucket) produces a line of 
upscale sodas known as Stewart’s.167  At the early stages of the 
organizational life cycle of Nantucket, its resource availability 
was apparently limited.168  One of Nantucket’s founders, Mr. 
Scott, was so financially strapped that he slept in his car during 
the summer of 1991.169  At that early stage, Nantucket sold its 
products through distributors170 who provided financial resources 
to Nantucket by purchasing high volumes of Nantucket sodas.171  
Arguably, Nantucket chose such a marketing strategy due to its 
financial inability to distribute its products on its own.  At this 
stage in Nantucket’s organizational life cycle, the reputation 
mechanism was relatively effective.  Nantucket had to rely on 
distributors, and therefore was restrained from acting 
opportunistically towards its distributors.172 
Nantucket’s financial situation improved dramatically over 
the years.  Revenues soared from $200,000 in 1991 to about $30 
million in 1996.173  In addition, the successful Nantucket group 
was purchased in 2002 by Cadbury Schweppes Plc, a British 
beverage giant,174 for an undisclosed sum that was estimated at 
$100 million.175 
Following the acquisition of Nantucket by Cadbury, 
Nantucket presumably reached a stage in its organizational life 
cycle in which it had enough financial resources to discontinue its 
reliance on distributors and perform all the distribution functions 
on its own.  In fact, one year following the acquisition of 
Nantucket by Cadbury, they both began exploring the possibility 
of discontinuing distributors.176  Instead, Nantucket and Cadbury 
 
 166 Day Distrib. Co. v. Nantucket Allserve, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57334 (D. 
Minn. July 25, 2008). 
 167 Id. at *1. 
 168 Robert Halasz, Company History: Nantucket Allserve, Inc., available at  
http://www.answers.com/topic/nantucket-allserve-inc (last visited Nov. 1, 2009). 
 169 Id. 
 170 Day Distrib. Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. at *2.  Two of the distributors began as sub-
distributors of Nantucket but later became distributors of Nantucket.  Id. 
 171 Id. at *3. 
 172 Halasz, supra note 168. 
 173 Id.  In 1996, Nantucket was ranked 13th in Inc’s fastest-growing U.S. private 
company list.  Id. 
 174 Corpfin Worldwide, Deal No. 171893 (June 19, 2009) (providing a summary of 
Snapple Beverage Group’s acquisition of Nantucket Allserve Inc.).  Notably, Cadbury 
bought Nantucket through Snapple Beverage Group, a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Cadbury.  Id. 
 175 Cadbury Schweppes PLC: Nantucket Nectars Purchase Will Build Snapple 
Beverages, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2002, at B.6. 
 176 Day Distrib. Co. 2008 U.S. Dist. at *5.  Two clarifying notes: Firstly, Cadbury 
Schweppes Americas Beverages, one of the defendants in the Nantucket case, was a 
subsidiary division of Cadbury in the United States.  Secondly, the court referred to 
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decided to distribute Stewart’s directly rather than to rely on 
distributors.177  At this stage, the reputation mechanism 
collapsed and termination without good cause was likely to occur.  
Unsurprisingly, Nantucket took its distribution operations in-
house and terminated the agreements with its distributors.178  
Apparently, Nantucket did not terminate the agreement due to 
the distributors’ failure to comply with their contractual 
requirements.179  Good cause supporting a termination was 
presumably absent.180 
CONCLUSION 
This article questioned the effectiveness of the reputation 
mechanism in deterring opportunistic termination by 
franchisors.  It also cast doubt upon the traditional law-and-
economics assumption that reputation can be a substitute for 
franchise termination laws. 
While this article focuses on franchise relationships, its 
conclusions can have broader implications.  The assumption that 
reputation can serve as a substitute for regulation of long-term 
commercial relationships must be re-examined.  As we have 
demonstrated, the concern for one’s reputation in long-term 
commercial relations often has a limited life cycle.  A firm in the 
early stages of its organizational life cycle usually lacks internal 
financial resources needed to achieve its business goals; 
therefore, it is spurred on to enter into contractual relationships 
with other firms that can assist it in overcoming its financial 
constraints.181  To illustrate, a financially immature firm, 
wishing to erect a factory, may have an initial incentive to enter 
into a partnership or a joint venture agreement with other firms, 
in order to recruit necessary capital.  At this stage the reputation 
mechanism has some deterring effects, since the young firm is 
economically dependent upon its contractual partners.  However, 
as the financial availability of the immature firm improves, it 
becomes less dependent on its contractual partners.  The firm’s 
 
Nantucket Allserve and Cadbury Schweppes Americas Beverages as “Cadbury,” following 
the practice of the parties.  Id. at *1–2. 
 177 Id. at *5. 
 178 Id. at *1. 
 179 It seems unlikely that all distributors concurrently failed to comply with 
Nantucket and Cadbury’s requirements. 
 180 For more cases which potentially reveal the collapse of the reputation mechanism 
in the context of franchise termination laws see C. C. Hauff Hardware, Inc. v. Long Mfg. 
Co., 148 N.W.2d 425 (Iowa 1967); Volvo Constr. Equip. N. Am., Inc. v. CLM Equip. Co., 
386 F.3d 581 (4th Cir. 2004); Sims Wholesale Co. v. Brown-Forman Corp., 468 S.E.2d 905 
(Va. 1996); Cooper Distrib. Co. v. Amana Refrigeration, 63 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 181 See supra Part II.A. 
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incentive will shift towards owning and operating the business 
on its own, which will increase its profits.  At this inevitable 
stage, the effectiveness of reputation in preventing opportunism 
will decline and the reputation mechanism may ultimately 
collapse. 
